A majority of Britons now want the Government to spend more on defence for the first time since the question was first asked, marking a striking shift in public attitudes as war in Europe, instability in the Middle East and uncertainty over US leadership reshape the country’s sense of security.
Fifty-six per cent of people favour increasing defence spending, against just 17 per cent who want it reduced, according to the British Social Attitudes survey published by the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen).
The findings suggest that support for strengthening the armed forces has moved beyond a traditional Conservative constituency and is becoming a mainstream political demand.
The proportion backing higher spending has doubled from 28 per cent in 2006 to 56 per cent today, with the sharpest recent change among Labour supporters.
Among Labour voters, support has climbed from 28 per cent in 2024 to 55 per cent, putting them closer to the 76 per cent of Conservatives who want more money devoted to defence. Support is even higher among Reform UK supporters, at 83 per cent, and stands at 62 per cent among Liberal Democrats.
Green voters remain a notable exception with 47 per cent favour spending less, while just 21 per cent want an increase.
The shift is also cutting across gender and age groups, although significant divisions remain. Support among women has risen from 40 per cent in 2025 to 52 per cent, compared with 60 per cent of men.
But the generational divide is pronounced. Almost two-thirds of people aged 55 and over, 62 per cent, want higher defence spending, compared with 47 per cent of those aged 35 to 54 and only 30 per cent of under-35s.
Among older Britons, support has increased by 16 percentage points since 2016. Among younger people, it has fallen by three points over the same period.
The survey suggests that perceptions of international danger are a powerful driver. Among respondents who regard at least five of seven countries as serious threats to peace, 64 per cent support increased defence spending. That falls to 38 per cent among those who identify three or fewer countries as threats.
Sophia Gaston, the report’s author, said Britain had undergone a fundamental change in how it views the world.
“The post-Cold War peace that endured for so many years no longer shapes the country’s worldview. War in Europe, instability in the Middle East, strategic competition with China and doubts about American leadership have led to a psychological shift in Britain, putting foreign policy and national security at the heart of the collective consciousness.”
Yet the growing appetite for defence investment does not mean voters are prepared to sacrifice other public services to pay for it.
In 2025, defence became the top spending priority for just 10 per cent of Britons, the first time it had reached double figures in four decades. Health remained far ahead at 41 per cent, followed by education at 17 per cent.
The relationship between defence and welfare spending is similarly complicated. Sixty per cent of those least sympathetic towards welfare support favour higher defence spending, compared with 36 per cent of the most sympathetic. But support for defence investment is identical, at 50 per cent, among people who want more or less money spent on retired people.
The biggest differences emerge over benefits for single parents and unemployed people, with gaps of 26 and 22 percentage points respectively. The report says this “suggests where a government that is seeking savings to fund defence might encounter less public resistance.”
However, separate polling by Ipsos and YouGov indicates that enthusiasm for higher military spending can weaken when voters are asked whether they would accept higher taxes, additional borrowing or cuts to public services.
That tension will matter as ministers attempt to translate growing concern about national security into a long-term funding settlement.
The Chancellor set a target of 2030 for defence spending to reach 3 per cent of GDP in last week’s Budget, while the Government remains committed to Nato’s target of 3.5 per cent on core defence by 2035.
The latest findings are based on 1,985 interviews conducted through the NatCen Opinion Panel between April 30 and May 31, 2026.
For ministers, the political landscape is changing: voters increasingly recognise the need for stronger defences, but the battle over who pays for them has barely begun.
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