A sustained campaign of suspected drone incursions over military and nuclear facilities across Europe has exposed significant weaknesses in NATO’s air defences and intensified concerns over Russia’s evolving hybrid warfare capabilities, according to a new report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
The London-based think tank identified 144 suspected drone incidents across 13 European countries between 2024 and 2026, arguing that the pattern points to a coordinated intelligence-gathering effort targeting critical infrastructure while remaining below the threshold likely to trigger a collective NATO response.
Among the locations highlighted are military installations in the UK, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, including several sites associated with Western nuclear deterrence.
The report draws particular attention to RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk, where drones were reported in November 2024 as the US prepared the base for the potential return of American nuclear weapons.
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Three other US-operated military sites in England also recorded drone activity during the same period.
IISS researchers suggest a sanctioned Russian tanker docked in Hull at the time may have served as a launch platform, raising broader questions about whether vessels from Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” are being used for intelligence operations alongside sanctions evasion.
However, British authorities have urged caution. A defence official told the Associated Press that a Defence Police investigation found no conclusive evidence linking the UK incidents directly to Russia.
That distinction reflects the broader challenge confronting European governments: attributing hybrid attacks with sufficient certainty to justify a coordinated political or military response.
The report argues that the suspected drone campaign forms part of Russia’s wider hybrid strategy, combining intelligence gathering, cyber activity, economic pressure and infrastructure disruption without crossing the threshold of conventional military conflict.
Researchers point to repeated drone activity over France’s submarine base at Île Longue, military installations in Belgium and the Netherlands believed to store US nuclear weapons, and more than 1,000 suspicious drone sightings reported by German authorities during 2025, many near defence manufacturers and training facilities supporting Ukraine.
Denmark also experienced a series of incursions linked by researchers to sanctioned vessels operating along its coastline, with drone sightings contributing to the temporary closure of Copenhagen Airport and activity near military installations.
Rather than isolated incidents, the report argues these events demonstrate an increasingly systematic effort to test NATO’s surveillance capabilities and political cohesion.
Charlie Edwards, Senior Fellow for Strategy and National Security at the IISS and one of the report’s authors, argues the pattern reveals a widening gap between Europe’s military capabilities and its decision-making processes.
According to the report, drones repeatedly entered sensitive airspace over a 15-month period without prompting a coordinated allied response.
That, the authors contend, creates a strategic vulnerability by allowing adversaries to probe critical infrastructure while avoiding the escalation associated with traditional military operations.
The findings are likely to intensify calls for NATO members to accelerate investment in counter-drone systems, integrated air surveillance networks and intelligence-sharing mechanisms as low-cost unmanned aircraft become an increasingly prominent feature of modern conflict.
The report also renews attention on Russia’s shadow fleet, a network estimated to comprise more than 700 ageing tankers transporting sanctioned Russian oil through opaque ownership structures and flags of convenience.
According to the UK’s Ministry of Defence, the fleet now carries around 75 per cent of Russia’s sanctioned oil exports, providing a vital source of revenue for Moscow despite Western sanctions.
If vessels within that network are also being used to support intelligence gathering or drone operations, the implications extend well beyond sanctions enforcement, potentially transforming commercial shipping into a platform for covert state activity.
Such a development would present difficult policy questions for European governments seeking to balance maritime security, international law and freedom of navigation.
The IISS concludes that the overall pattern strongly suggests a coordinated campaign consistent with Russian hybrid warfare tactics.
Yet officials continue to emphasise that direct attribution remains difficult.
British investigators have not established conclusive evidence linking the UK drone incidents to the Kremlin, while NATO officials have stopped short of formally assigning responsibility despite acknowledging that the activity aligns with broader patterns of disruption observed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
For policymakers, that ambiguity may be the report’s most significant finding. Hybrid operations are designed not necessarily to cause immediate destruction, but to exploit uncertainty, test political resolve and expose vulnerabilities in democratic societies.
As Europe expands defence spending and strengthens critical infrastructure, the report suggests the challenge will increasingly lie not only in intercepting drones, but in developing faster and more coordinated responses to the grey-zone tactics that are becoming a defining feature of modern geopolitical competition.
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