France and Germany are facing calls to explain their reported offers to finance a new fleet of hunter-killer submarines for Argentina, amid warnings that the proposed deal could complicate Britain’s ability to defend the Falkland Islands and expose tensions in Europe’s emerging security partnerships.
The competing offers from France’s Naval Group and Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) come as Prime Minister Andy Burnham seeks closer defence and economic ties with the European Union, raising difficult questions about how far Britain’s allies should go in strengthening the military capabilities of a country that continues to claim sovereignty over British territory in the South Atlantic.
Argentina’s military leadership says it is considering three advanced submarines, with Admiral Marcelo Dalle Nogare, chief of the country’s armed forces joint staff, confirming earlier this month that French and German manufacturers had put forward proposals.
“Whichever of the two options we choose, they are among the best submarines in the world today,” Dalle Nogare told the Rotary Club of Buenos Aires on October 7.
The offers are reported to include financing arrangements under which France and Germany would cover the initial cost, with Buenos Aires repaying in instalments. Neither government has publicly confirmed those terms. TKMS confirmed it had submitted a proposal based on the Argentine navy’s requirements, but said it had not received official communication from the government on the programme. A decision in principle was expected in 2026, the company said.
The potential acquisition has alarmed British politicians and defence campaigners, who argue that three modern submarines could force the UK to devote significantly greater resources to monitoring the South Atlantic. The concern is not that Argentina could immediately challenge Britain’s military position, but that an upgraded submarine force could create a more demanding and expensive long-term security problem.
Andrew Rosindell, a Reform UK MP and former member of the UK delegation to Nato’s parliamentary assembly, condemned the reported offers.
“It is shocking that France and Germany – two of our supposed closest allies – are considering financing three new ‘hunter-killer’ submarines for Argentina,” he told GB News.
He accused the European powers of “rewarding threats of aggression, changing the balance of power in the South Atlantic, and undermining the security of the Falkland Islands”.
Rosindell called on the government to summon the French and German ambassadors and demand an explanation. He said a written question he had submitted to the Ministry of Defence had received what he described as a “non-answer” from ministers.
The government has sought to emphasise that Britain’s military presence in the islands remains robust. Armed Forces Minister Louise Sandher-Jones told parliament that the Ministry of Defence regularly engaged with French and German allies and was committed to maintaining a defensive presence in the South Atlantic.
The force stationed on the Falklands includes about 1,500 military personnel, Typhoon combat aircraft, ground-based air defences and the Royal Navy’s permanent South Atlantic patrol vessel, HMS Medway. Britain has also previously said it could reinforce the islands through other overseas territories, including Ascension Island, which played a key logistical role during the 1982 conflict.
But defence specialists warn that the prospect of advanced Argentine submarines would pose a different kind of challenge. Existing British defences are designed to address air and surface threats as well as maritime risks, while submarines can operate covertly over large areas of ocean, potentially requiring persistent surveillance and anti-submarine capabilities.
Former British Army officer Henry Bolton said the proposed acquisition could be a “game changer” because of the cost and complexity of tracking the vessels around the clock.
“If the angle was right and it positioned itself correctly, we wouldn’t know about it until it hit something of ours,” Bolton said of a hypothetical encounter with a German-built submarine. “The first we’d know of it is a torpedo heading for the Queen Elizabeth.”
The scenario was speculative, and Bolton acknowledged that Britain could potentially detect and destroy such submarines. The difficulty, he argued, would be the resources required to do so.
For the UK, he said, the prospect of three new boats would mean monitoring them “24/7, 365 days a year”, a burden that could place further pressure on already stretched naval capabilities.
Former naval officer Stuart Fawcett agreed that persistent monitoring would become strategically important. “From a naval operational perspective, ocean and subsea surveillance capabilities would become a strategic necessity in the South Atlantic,” he said.
The issue comes at a sensitive moment for British defence planning. The government launched Atlantic Bastion in 2025 to strengthen its response to Russian submarine and spy-vessel activity in the North Atlantic and undersea infrastructure. Yet a recent Commons Defence Committee report identified what it called “glaring gaps” in Britain’s ability to protect the High North, alongside a “shockingly low availability” of countermeasures against Russian aggression.
Bolton argued that a new Argentine submarine fleet could force Britain to divert resources from Nato’s northern flank. “Our focus should (be) Nato’s northern flank and ideally not the Falklands,” he said. “So it’s a distraction from all that.”
He also suggested Argentina could be making a rational strategic calculation: if Britain had to spend increasingly large sums protecting the islands, the financial burden might gradually weaken the political will to resist Buenos Aires diplomatically.
That does not mean Argentina would be ready to deploy an effective submarine fleet immediately. Dalle Nogare has said delivery would be expected around six years after a contract was signed. Training crews, maintaining vessels and constructing the necessary infrastructure would take further time and investment.
Argentina has operated German-built Type 209 submarines in the past, including the ARA Salta and ARA San Luis, acquired in the 1970s. During the Falklands War, the San Luis patrolled and launched torpedo attacks against British warships, although it scored no hits. Despite technical problems, it evaded British anti-submarine forces and remained in service until 1997.
The history adds political weight to the current debate. Fawcett pointed to the legacy of French naval exports to Argentina, particularly the Exocet missile strikes that sank HMS Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor in 1982, contributing to 46 British deaths.
“That history looms large in public memory as we attempt to build a modernised bilateral relationship,” he said.
Yet the proposed submarine deal also raises questions about how Western governments engage with Argentina under President Javier Milei. The Argentine leader has pursued military modernisation, including the delivery of 12 F-16 fighter jets from Denmark, with another 12 expected in 2028. At the same time, he has continued to press his country’s claim to the Falklands.
Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Milei said Argentina could be forced to “take matters into our own hands”, although he stressed that he did not “believe in military solutions” to advance the country’s national cause.
Dalle Nogare has offered a more pointed view of the sovereignty dispute. “I’ve always said that I believe the Falklands will eventually be recovered on the day it is no longer economically feasible for the United Kingdom to maintain them,” he said, according to Argentine publication El Cronista.
The comments have intensified concerns among British campaigners that military modernisation could eventually increase pressure on the islands, even without an immediate prospect of conflict.
Robert Midgley, a spokesman for the Friends of the British Overseas Territories, called the reported submarine proposals “a diplomatic failure of the British state”. He argued that the armed forces were already spread thin and that Britain had failed to respond adequately to Argentine lobbying efforts in South America.
He also stressed the principle at the heart of the dispute: the Falkland Islands’ population has repeatedly voted against a transfer of sovereignty, and its right to self-determination should be respected.
Not all defence observers see the submarine proposals solely through the prism of the Falklands. Fawcett argued that Argentina, alongside Brazil and Chile, has an important role in regional stability, particularly as China seeks to expand its influence over South American maritime trade and infrastructure.
Modernising Argentina’s navy could be compatible with Western security interests, he said, provided any external financing or support came with firm diplomatic assurances, security clauses and commitments against aggression concerning the Falklands.
The financing question may ultimately prove decisive. Dalle Nogare said the final choice would be geopolitical, shaped by national interests and, above all, the availability of money. Any export would also require the relevant government’s authorisation, giving Paris and Berlin a direct role in deciding whether the programme proceeds.
For Burnham, who has pledged to bring Britain closer to Europe and recently ratified a security treaty with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, the issue presents a diplomatic balancing act. Deeper European defence co-operation could strengthen Britain’s wider security relationships, but the prospect of European-built submarines entering Argentine service risks creating friction over a territory whose sovereignty London refuses to negotiate.
The government insists that the Falklands’ defences remain robust and that their suitability is under constant review. Whether that posture would be sufficient in a future shaped by a modern Argentine submarine fleet is a question that cannot be answered by the current proposals alone.
The immediate issue is therefore less the prospect of an imminent military confrontation than the strategic and financial consequences of a deal that could take years to deliver. If Argentina proceeds, Britain may face a choice between investing more heavily in undersea surveillance in the South Atlantic or accepting a more demanding security environment around the islands.
For two European allies seeking closer defence ties with London, the question is whether strengthening Argentina’s military capabilities can be reconciled with Britain’s continuing responsibility to defend the Falklands. The answer will depend not only on the submarines themselves, but on the political conditions attached to any agreement — and on whether diplomacy can prevent a commercial arms deal from becoming another source of tension among Western partners.
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