Russia would not need to send tanks across the Channel to bring Britain to a standstill.
A disrupted electricity network, paralysed hospitals, inaccessible bank accounts or failing communications could inflict widespread damage without a shot being fired, according to Sir Grant Shapps, the former defence secretary.
His warning captures a growing concern among British security officials that the country’s vulnerabilities extend far beyond the conventional battlefield, and that an adversary could exploit them to undermine public confidence, disrupt daily life and test the government’s ability to respond.
“The next attack on Britain may not look like the start of a war,” Shapps said. “It may look like an ordinary Monday morning when everything suddenly stops working.”
The statement, part of an increasingly urgent debate about national security, comes as the head of the British Army warns that the country faces “extreme jeopardy” and that political leaders will soon need to have a frank conversation with the public about preparing for conflict, the Express reported.
Together, the interventions point to a difficult message for ministers: Britain must prepare not only to deter military aggression abroad, but also to withstand disruption at home — while persuading taxpayers that greater defence spending, and potentially sacrifices elsewhere in public services, are necessary.
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Shapps, who warned in 2024 that Britain had entered a “pre-war world”, said the discussion about military readiness remained essential but risked overlooking the infrastructure on which modern society depends.
“We spend a great deal of time debating whether Britain has enough missiles, aircraft, warships and troops to defend itself,” he said. “And rightly so, because there are serious concerns about our military readiness.”
But he asked whether the country was devoting comparable attention to defending its electricity supplies, hospitals, banking systems, water networks and communications.
“Russia doesn’t need to invade Britain to threaten Britain,” he said, pointing to cyberattacks, sabotage, disruption to energy supplies and attacks on critical infrastructure as methods of causing serious damage without provoking an immediate conventional military response.
Such threats are hard to manage precisely because they don’t necessarily resemble war as the public has traditionally understood it. A military attack has a visible aggressor and an identifiable moment of escalation. A cyber incident or infrastructure failure can initially appear to be a technical malfunction, leaving authorities to establish what happened, who was responsible and whether further disruption is imminent.
The consequences, however, could be felt across the economy. Businesses dependent on digital payments and communications could be unable to trade. Hospitals might struggle to maintain normal services. Disruption to energy or water supplies could quickly become a public emergency.
The danger is not that every outage would result from hostile action, but that a hostile actor could exploit vulnerabilities or uncertainty when the country is already under pressure.
That prospect is sharpening the debate over how Britain should define defence—and where responsibility for delivering it should lie.
General Sir Roly Walker, the army’s chief, has warned soldiers that the international environment is so dangerous that they must be prepared to fight if called upon. He also suggested the public should expect a more direct discussion with political leaders about the sacrifices needed to strengthen national security.
“They’re going to try and explain to our citizens that our citizens have got to consent to sacrifices to prioritise defence and security,” Walker told soldiers.
He said the public would also need to understand the role the armed forces play and why supporting them could require difficult choices. Ultimately, he warned, the burden of fighting would fall on soldiers, including the youngest and least experienced members of the land forces.
“And I’m looking at you because it’s on you that the defence of this nation will rest, if ultimately, you are called to fight,” he said.
The language reflects the challenge facing the government as it seeks to increase defence spending while public services and household finances remain under pressure. Ministers are expected to explain why they must redirect tens of billions of pounds from other priorities to support a larger defence budget.
That argument is unlikely to be settled by military readiness figures alone. The public will also want to know what additional spending is intended to achieve, how quickly new capabilities can be delivered and whether investment in conventional forces will be matched by improvements to the resilience of civilian infrastructure.
Intelligence chiefs have also sought to make the case for a broader national response.
Sir Ken McCallum, director-general of MI5, has urged people, businesses and communities to recognise that Britain operates in a more contested international environment. He said the country must remain clear-eyed about the pressure adversaries may try to exert while retaining confidence in its ability to resist.
“You should expect to hear more from government in the coming months on how we can all be more resilient,” McCallum said.
The emphasis on society-wide resilience suggests that ministers intend to extend the debate beyond the armed forces and intelligence agencies. Businesses responsible for essential services, local communities and individual households may all be asked to consider how they would cope with interruptions to everyday systems.
Yet the political difficulty will be translating warnings about an uncertain threat into practical measures without fuelling public alarm. Authorities must distinguish between credible risks and worst-case scenarios, explain what preparations are proportionate and demonstrate that the institutions responsible for protecting the country are themselves ready.
The geopolitical backdrop has made that task more pressing. A diplomatic dispute over Ukraine and access to Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network has highlighted the importance of private technology infrastructure to modern warfare.
Ukrainian military commanders have argued that restrictions on access to the network have weakened their ability to respond to Russian missiles and drones, with potential consequences for civilians. Musk has denied responsibility for imposing the limits, saying decisions about speed and usage were made by the US military and ultimately President Donald Trump.
The dispute illustrates how battlefield capabilities can depend on commercial systems and decisions made outside a country’s direct control. It also underlines the uncertainty confronting European governments as they assess how reliably the United States will support Ukraine and wider European security.
Britain has sought to maintain pressure on Moscow despite Trump’s reported decision to halt a sanctions package that had been due to take effect on Sunday. Health Secretary Yvette Cooper said the UK would continue increasing pressure on Russia.
Former foreign secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind delivered a sharply critical assessment of Trump’s approach, accusing the US president of betraying Ukraine and arguing that the decision could expose Ukrainians to greater danger. His comments reflected wider concerns among supporters of Kyiv about the consequences of weakening military and economic pressure on Moscow.
For Britain, the implications extend beyond the future of the war in Ukraine. If European governments face a more uncertain American commitment while Russia continues to pose a security challenge, the burden of deterring aggression and protecting domestic infrastructure may increasingly fall on European states themselves.
That does not mean an attack on Britain is inevitable, nor that every technical failure should be interpreted as sabotage. But the warnings from Shapps, Walker and McCallum suggest that officials want the country to take seriously a spectrum of threats that could unfold without a formal declaration of war.
The test for ministers will be whether they can turn that warning into credible preparation: protecting essential services, strengthening military capabilities and explaining the costs honestly.
The prospect Shapps described is unsettling precisely because it would not necessarily begin with explosions, troops or an unmistakable declaration of hostilities. It could begin with the familiar routines of an ordinary working day — and the sudden discovery that the systems on which the country depends no longer work.
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