Russia was set to become the clear winner in the Iranian conflict as global oil prices surged and the U.S. issued waivers for sanctions on Russian oil. But in March, Ukraine stepped up its offensive campaign against Russia’s oil infrastructure, striking the Yaroslavl oil refinery on April 25th and recently hitting refineries and depots in the Baltic Sea and Samara. Getting Russia to negotiate depends on Ukraine’s ability to keep up its deep precision strike campaign – and Europe should take note.
In February 2026, IEA data showed Western sanctions against Russia were working as Russia’s oil export revenues fell to 6.6 million barrels per day, its lowest since 2022. Russia’s defence sector was ramping up production, but the rest of the country’s economy was on the brink of recession until oil prices spiked and the first week of April saw Russia’s oil export receipts reach its highest level since 2022. However, Ukraine’s deep precision strike (DPS) campaign has limited Russia’s potential profits by focusing on the Baltic Sea and Black Sea ports, reducing Russia’s oil export capacity by about 40%.
As the Atlantic Council observed at the end of April, “Ukraine’s air offensive against Russia’s energy infrastructure looks set to continue gaining momentum in the coming months as new Ukrainian drone and missile capabilities become available. The prospect of a further escalation in long-range Ukrainian attacks is sparking considerable alarm in the Kremlin.” Ukraine’s capacity to produce long-range missiles and drones for such a campaign could also receive a boost from the €90-billion-loan the EU finally approved following Hungary’s election of a new president.
Building capacity
Ukraine’s spring offensive efforts are also in response to the suffering caused this winter by Russia’s own long range strike campaigns against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. This year’s particularly low temperatures combined with more intense and accurate long-range missile strikes on key cities across the country, damaging all of Ukraine’s major thermal and hydropower plants, made this winter particularly miserable for Ukrainians.
Ukraine relies on Western air defence systems – first with American Patriot systems, later receiving French/Italian SAMP/T systems that have proven their worth and cost effectiveness. These were both crucial for protecting civilians and infrastructure as best as possible, but Ukraine realised the only way to get Russia to negotiate was if they, too, hit hard and deep within enemy territory.
Ukraine had already been doing so sporadically since Russia first invaded in 2022, albeit with more limited success given its arsenal started from almost nothing at the beginning of the war. At the outset, Ukraine relied primarily on Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles (500km range) supplied by the UK/France to hurt Russia’s energy and arms production, but has also used American-provided ATACMS that come with restrictions from the Pentagon.
Ukraine’s most recent strikes have relied primarily on long-range drones, that whilst capable of causing damage, cannot cause the type of destruction that heavy-payload missiles can. That could change as Ukraine revealed new long-range missiles in 2025 that might see increased production with financing from the EU’s latest loan. Some, like the FP-7 and FP-9, are based on Russian designs which reduced development times. Others are adapted like the long-range (1,000km), land-attack version of Ukraine’s Neptune missile Zelensky revealed in March 2025. Then there is Ukraine’s new Flamingo cruise missile (3,000km range) which hit a Russian missile plant in February, although its efficacy is still uncertain.
Marc de Vore for The Atlantic Council argued that, “Ukraine’s unique defense sector ecosystem has made it possible to produce an extraordinary number of long-range strike systems…” and urges European allies to fund increased production. Meanwhile, Iryna Terekh, chief technical officer of Fire Point which produces the Flamingo, said she hopes the rest of Europe will be “learning lessons” from Ukraine saying, “We are a bloody example, in terms of being prepared for war.”
Is Europe “Prepared for War?”
Given that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned Europe of a possible attack within the next five years, one would hope European leaders are doing everything necessary to “learn lessons.” Writing for Bruegel, Alexandr Burilkov and Guntram Wolff explained such lessons include that European air defence systems are too limited/costly, that Europe “should learn from Ukraine’s campaign to degrade Russian capabilities” and that “ missiles are far more likely than drones to succeed in destroying targets…” The goal is “deterrence through strength” so “European governments should order more from, and become more reliable long-term customers of, European missile producers.”
Europe is not entirely lacking in terms of DPS. There are existing air-launched capabilities including the German Taurus missile, and the Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles with recent combat-proven capabilities in Ukraine and India. There is also the sea-launched NCM with a range of 1,400km, successfully used in Syria. The problem is that only France and the UK possess combat-proven missiles and orders from the two countries are not enough to scale up stockpiles to fully enter into a European high-intensity logic.
There are other projects underway like Britain’s Project Nightfall to produce a low-cost 500km+ ballistic missile for Ukraine. The UK and Germany are developing the Deep Precision Strike missiles with hopes for production in the 2030s. Meanwhile, Poland has significantly increased military spending with General Wies?aw Kuku?a, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, listing DPS as a top priority. Work is being done on a homegrown cruise missile, the Lanca, but that too will probably not be available until the 2030s. The Dutch Ministry of Defence asked for designs for a domestic ‘Tomahawk-like’ missile, and MBDA is developing the LCM, a ground-launched variant of NCM with testing expected for 2028.
In pursuit of pooling resources to develop EU-sovereign long-range missiles, France, Germany, Italy and Poland launched the ELSA (European Long-Range Strike Approach) initiative in July 2024 with the UK and Sweden joining shortly after. Participants were to select a project based on a “best athletes” approach, precisely to avoid the industrial and financial dispersion illustrated above, with the LCM considered an early-frontrunner. But stilted political leadership in 2025 slowed the initiative and only resulted in a letter of intent signed by members on 12 February 2026 to progress mature projects including, “low-cost 500km+ capabilities based on one-wayattack effectors.” As Sam Cranny-Evans from Calibre Defence observes, this focuses on solutions for overwhelming enemy defences, but does not include ground-launched, heavy-hitting, long-range missiles ELSA was initially formed to provide and that European nations are seeking.
Indeed, Poland expressed interest last summer in such capabilities and rumours circulated this spring that Poland would acquire French missile systems including the LCM and NCM when President Macron met with Prime Minister Tusk in April. For the moment, no specific announcements were made other than to pursue “long-range strike systems.”
Andrius Kubilius recently said the EC would look into “new policy instruments for European stockpiling of different ammunition, different weapons” in response to complaints from Europe’s defence producers that they are unable to increase production without European governments committing to “long-term defence purchases to provide industry with predictability.” It is unfortunate that ELSA’s focus has shifted away from what Europe really needs now. Jointly placing orders for mature projects is the only way to create sufficient stockpiles of sovereign long-range missiles in time to deter Russian aggression or be able to respond effectively as Ukraine has been trying to do with its efforts to hinder Russia’s ability to profit from the war in Iran.
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