For decades, Britain has grappled with the same question whenever defence spending rises on the political agenda: Can the country afford it?
The uncomfortable truth is that Britain can afford to spend more on defence today.
The real question is whether the government will take action before a crisis compels them to do so.
History tells us all that governments rarely make significant defence commitments when threats are visible only to experts; they tend to act only when the danger becomes impossible for the public to ignore.
Throughout modern history, the United Kingdom has allocated a higher share of national wealth to defence because leaders understood one fundamental principle: security is not a luxury.
During World War II, Britain found the resources necessary to fight for national survival. During the Cold War, substantial funds were committed because the threat from the Soviet Union was viewed as immediate and serious. The money was mobilised because the danger was clear.
Today, Britain faces a different but increasingly complex security environment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered the belief that a major war in Europe was a thing of the past.
Before February 2022, many governments acknowledged Moscow’s ambitions but acted with little urgency — this changed dramatically once Russian forces crossed the border. Almost overnight, European nations realised that billions could be allocated for defence, military support, and national resilience. The lesson was clear: while the funds were available, the political urgency was not.
Britain’s debate over defence spending now encounters a similar challenge. Advocates for lower spending often cite Britain’s geography and nuclear deterrent as significant advantages. The UK benefits from its island position, and its nuclear capability remains a powerful deterrent against existential threats. However, modern security cannot be assessed solely on the ability to prevent invasion.
A nuclear weapon cannot protect undersea internet cables, energy infrastructure, satellites, shipping routes, or supply chains. It cannot stop hostile states from employing cyberattacks, economic pressure, or hybrid warfare to undermine a country. The battlefield of the future extends far beyond tanks crossing borders.
History repeatedly demonstrates that warnings are often ignored until crises emerge. Before World War I, many Europeans underestimated the likelihood of a devastating continental conflict. Before World War II, many hoped diplomacy could avert catastrophe. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, many believed a full-scale war in Europe was unlikely. In each case, the warning signs were present, but the belief that the threat would materialise was lacking.
This is why Britain’s current debate over defence matters. The resignations of senior defence officials over concerns about military funding should not be dismissed as mere political disagreements. Those responsible for national security have access to intelligence assessments and strategic information that is not available to the public at large. When these officials warn that Britain is not investing enough in its armed forces, their concerns merit serious consideration.
The issue is not whether every pound spent on defence is automatically justified, but rather whether Britain is prepared for a world that is becoming more perilous. Military readiness takes years to establish. Equipment cannot be procured overnight. Skilled personnel cannot be trained instantly. Industrial capacity cannot be rebuilt once a crisis begins. The most cost-effective time to prepare is before an emergency arises.
Britain may eventually significantly increase defence spending. History suggests that democracies often make difficult decisions only after facing a shock. However, the lesson from Ukraine is not merely that war is unpredictable. It is those countries that prepare before danger arrives that have options — while those that wait until a crisis hits are left to pay a far higher price.
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