Britain’s air traffic control network is facing a potentially serious resilience risk as the central processor responsible for managing aircraft across the country approaches a point at which it could become “unsupported”, raising the prospect that a major failure could paralyse commercial aviation for days.
The National Airspace System (NAS), which manages the processing of flight information across British airspace, traces its origins to US technology developed under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Britain adopted the system during the 1970s and it has remained in continuous service ever since.
One Nats insider compared the situation to owning equipment whose “manufacturer is no longer around and parts and knowledge aren’t available. If it works, fine, but when it breaks, it’s gone.”
A senior air traffic control figure offered a more concise assessment: “All technology has a sunset date, after all.”
The vulnerability has emerged at a particularly difficult moment for Nats, which is facing scrutiny following its third major IT failure in as many years. A four-hour outage last Tuesday disrupted airports across the country and left thousands of passengers stranded, while chief executive Martin Rolfe has been asked to provide preliminary findings from an internal investigation to regulators.
Reports have suggested that a military aircraft flight plan may have triggered the latest failure, although the Ministry of Defence has denied responsibility.
Rolfe, who has led Nats since 2015, has received £12.6mn in pay and bonuses during his tenure. The organisation is 49 per cent owned by British taxpayers.
“The buck stops with him,” a Whitehall source said.
But industry figures have warned that replacing Rolfe would not necessarily address the deeper structural problems facing the organisation.
Around 400 senior managers belong to a “personal contract group” whose bonuses are linked to reductions in flight delays, financial performance and individual objectives. Those managers received close to 90 per cent of the maximum bonus available under group-wide performance measures.
Nats does not disclose bonus payments in monetary terms. Across its 5,076 employees, average annual remuneration is £115,000.
Airlines are meanwhile facing losses running into tens of millions of pounds after about 2,000 flights were cancelled following the latest “technical glitch”. A similar failure in 2023 cost carriers about £65mn.
The regulatory framework has also come under scrutiny. The Civil Aviation Authority can impose penalties on Nats for delays, but not cancellations, prompting concerns that the system could create distorted incentives.
“The underlying model whereby carriers are liable for mistakes outside their control needs to be on the table,” said Tim Alderslade, chief executive of Airlines. “Industry is looking for accountability and a resilience and systems plan that will stand up to scrutiny.”
Attempts to replace the ageing NAS began in the 1990s. A new system supplied by Spanish technology company Indra was initially scheduled for 2015, before being pushed back to 2021 and then 2030. Nats has now confirmed there is no formal adoption date, with one insider suggesting implementation may not occur until well into the 2030s.
Airlines have accused Nats of prioritising shareholder returns over investment. Dividends averaged £54mn annually during the 11 years to 2020 before rising to £124mn a year over the following two and a half years, amounting to £309mn.
Air traffic control specialists argue that replacing safety-critical infrastructure while maintaining a live national network is exceptionally difficult. Rolfe has compared the task to “like trying to change the wheels on an F1 car while driving down the home straight at full speed”.
Nats rejects claims that its systems will become irreparable after 2030.
A spokesman said it had “comprehensive plans to ensure our systems remain safe and appropriately supported for as long as they are required”, adding that more than £1bn had been invested in technology over the past decade.
The organisation said safety-critical infrastructure operating continuously “cannot simply be switched off while a new system is installed”, meaning replacement must be carried out through carefully managed stages and extensive testing.
The dispute nevertheless exposes a wider problem for Britain’s aviation infrastructure: a system that has operated for decades is being asked to remain reliable while its replacement continues to recede into the future.
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